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Abstract: The 2011 Newfoundland and Labrador election would mark a turning point in 
provincial politics.  The exit of the extraordinarily popular former premier, Danny Williams, in 
the year prior to the contest guaranteed that the election would, at a minimum, diverge from the 
pattern set in recent years.  Equally significant, Williams’ successor, Kathy Dunderdale, is a 
historic figure: she was the first woman to lead the province and one of only eight women ever to 
hold the top office in a Canadian province.  We give an account of the determinants of the vote 
decision in the 2011 election. We conclude that a fairly standard set of demographic and long-
term dispositional influences were highly influential in voters’ choices. At the same time, our 
analysis suggests that strategic considerations – especially concerning the Liberals and NDP – 
are critical to understanding the final outcome. 
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Résumé: L’élection provincial de 2011 allait marquer un tournant dans la politique provincial de 
Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador. Le départ de Danny Williams, un premier minister très populaire, et le 
fait que son successeur, Kathy Dunderdale, était la première femme à occuper ce poste à Terre-
Neuve, suggéraient que cette élection se distinguerait des précédents. Nous éxaminons les 
déterminants de la décision de vote et nous concluons qu’un ensemble assez standard 
d'influences démographiques et dispositionnelles à long terme expliquent le choix des électeurs. 
Notre analyse suggère aussie que des considérations stratégiques – concernant, en particulier les 
Libéraux et le NPD -  ont joué, elles aussi, un rôle important. 
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The 2011 election in Newfoundland 
and Labrador reflected a number of firsts in 
the province’s history. While the election 
led to a third straight term for the 
Progressive Conservative Party, it also 
resulted in the election of the first female 
premier in the province, as well as a record 
number of seats for the New Democratic 
Party. Results from Elections Newfoundland 
indicate that the PC Party won the election 
with 56.1% of the popular vote, obtaining 37 
of 48 seats (6 less than it held before the writ 
was dropped); the Liberal Party gained two 
seats, obtaining a total of six seats with 
19.1% of the popular vote; while the NDP 
secured five seats (gaining four) with 24.6% 
of the popular vote. 
Parts of this outcome were 
foreseeable from the outset: while Kathy 
Dunderdale was not as popular as the PC 
Party’s previous leader, Danny Williams, 
there was little doubt that she would form 
government after October 11
th
, 2011. Given 
the substantial financial difficulties faced by 
the Liberal Party (CBC, 2011b), as well as 
the need for a quick leadership race after 
Yvonne Jones stepped down due to health 
concerns (Canadian Press, 2011b), the party 
was expected to struggle in the election. 
Polling results consistently demonstrated 
that the Liberals were lagging behind the 
others—even behind the NDP, which had 
historically played a very minor role in the 
provincial party system—and most voters 
were arguably aware of how the parties 
would do at the end of the day. As 
commentator Rex Murphy notes, “there was 
never a moment in the election during which 
either the Liberals, or the NDP, under 
stalwart Lorraine Michael, posed the 
slightest threat to the Conservatives” (2011). 
If the partisan identity of the 
government following the election was a 
foregone conclusion, the identity of the 
official opposition was not. The “real race” 
in this election was, arguably, that between 
the Liberal and NDP parties. Given the 
reporting of polls throughout the campaign, 
voters likely perceived that the NDP was 
gaining ground, complicating voters’ 
traditional reckonings of the strategic 
landscape of provincial politics. In this 
uncertain environment, campaign events – 
particularly the leaders’ debate – may have 
been critical sources of strategic 
information: a notably strong – or weak – 
performance by one of Lorraine Michael 
(NDP) or Kevin Aylward (Liberal) could 
have provided an important signal about the 
prospects of their parties. Strategic dynamics 
aside, the issue agenda of the campaign was 
always likely to find the economy front and 
center. Bucking the global trend of late, 
Newfoundland and Labrador’s economic 
stability, given its recent oil wealth, meant 
that most residents were generally satisfied 
with the incumbent and complacent about 
the election in general. This may have, in 
one sense, diminished the importance of the 
economy – governments tend to be punished 
in bad times, rather than rewarded in good 
times – and, more generally, reduced the 
intensity of issue conflict in the election. 
That said, even if short-run factors like these 
were a minor chord in the campaign, more 
long-standing conflicts rooted in social 
group memberships, partisanship, and 
fundamental value differences may yet have 
operated. Indeed, a paucity of issues may 
serve to elevate the importance of 
judgmental shortcuts grounded in social 
identities. 
In this paper we give an account of 
the determinants of the vote decision in 
Newfoundland and Labrador’s 2011 
election. We begin with a brief review of the 
general influences on the vote decision 
commonly theorized in the voting behaviour 
literature, before turning to an account of the 
contextual specifics of the 2011 campaign. 
We next describe our data source: an 
academic survey of provincial electoral 
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behaviour in Newfoundland and Labrador. 
After a discussion of important coding 
decisions, we give an account of campaign 
dynamics – specifically, of the flow of vote 
intentions and of attitudes toward party 
leaders – before turning to an explanation of 
vote choice at the individual level. We 
conclude that a fairly standard set of 
demographic and long-term dispositional 
influences loomed large in voters’ choices. 
At the same time, the analysis suggests that 
strategic considerations – especially those 
involving the relative electoral positions of 
the Liberals and NDP – are critical to 
understanding the final outcome. 
Background and Literature 
When voters go to the polls on 
Election Day, they have a lot of things to 
consider. Political scientists have spent years 
trying to determine what exactly voters are 
thinking about when they decide to vote for 
one party over another. What we know as a 
result of those efforts is that there are a lot of 
factors that influence vote choice and that 
different factors matter for different people 
at different times. From partisanship to the 
economy, from gender to religion, from our 
interpretation of poll results to our 
understanding of federalism and the roles of 
different levels of government, a number of 
forces come into play as we step into the 
ballot box. Context matters, and events that 
take place before and during campaigns can 
have an important impact on electoral 
outcomes. 
Dating from the earliest years 
(Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; 
Campbell et al., 1960), scholars have noted 
the critical role of long-term forces: 
partisanship, ideological beliefs, and the 
socio-demographic characteristics of voters. 
Studies indicate that those characteristics 
that are fundamental to how we were 
socialized affect how we vote. Therefore, 
party loyalties affect vote choice and issue 
attitudes (Campbell et al., 1960; Green et al., 
2002), as do gender (Almond and Verba, 
1963; Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Gidengil 
et al., 2003) and other socio-demographics 
(Bartels, 1996; Conover and Feldman, 
1986). Generally speaking, long-term forces 
play an integral role in explaining beliefs, 
perceptions, issue attitudes, and vote choice.   
Given that partisanship is a long-
term identification (Green et al., 2002; 
Johnston, 2006), and considering that 
voters’ gender and ethnic identifications do 
not generally change between elections, 
these factors cannot really explain short-
term fluctuations in vote choice. Short-term 
forces are, therefore, also important to 
understanding vote choice: factors such as 
candidates, party leaders, and campaign 
issues and platforms can help to explain 
short-term changes (Stokes, Campbell and 
Miller, 1958). Miller and Shanks’ (1996) 
seminal research supports the inclusion of 
short-term forces in voting models, as they 
argue that both long-term and short-term 
forces have their proper places in models of 
vote choice. 
We suspect that both long- and short-
term forces were at play in this most recent 
election in Newfoundland and Labrador. 
Factors such as gender, age, ideological 
views, and partisanship are likely to have 
influenced voters on Election Day, as they 
do in every election. We also argue, 
however, that context was important to this 
election. In particular, three factors seem 
most pertinent: a) the provincial economy, 
which was doing well; b) the incredible 
popularity of the Progressive Conservative 
Party’s former leader, Danny Williams; and 
c) the groundbreaking gains made by the 
New Democratic Party in the federal House 
of Commons, including the securing of two 
seats in the St. John’s area. These three 
factors came together to provide the 
backdrop to the election, colouring the 
nature of competition during the campaign. 
In the end, we suggest that the story of the 
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campaign was really about who was going 
to form the official opposition, and coverage 
of campaign events, including the debates, 
repeatedly highlighted this “race for second 
place” in the minds of voters. 
The Economy: The province of 
Newfoundland and Labrador has 
experienced a period of economic wealth 
and GDP growth as a result of the success of 
its oil industry. A recent report indicates 
that, in the last two decades, real GDP 
growth has grown by over 50%, and over 
half of this growth can be attributed to the 
oil industry, which accounts for nearly one 
third of the province’s annual GDP 
(Government of Newfoundland and 
Labrador, 2011). This increase in provincial 
wealth has led to an increase in government 
spending and a sense among residents that 
“times are good”. Among other things, 
housing prices have increased substantially 
over the last five to ten years (Canada 
Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 2011), 
suggesting residents would have felt this 
economic “boom” most acutely.  
As scholars of voting behaviour have 
repeatedly shown (e.g., Duch and 
Stephenson, 2008), perceptions of economic 
health and growth generally lead to support 
for incumbents, given that, in such 
circumstances, incumbents would seem to 
have shown themselves to be able managers 
of the economy. Government turnover is 
likelier in times of economic hardship, as 
voters opt to “throw the rascals out.” By this 
logic, we would expect general satisfaction 
with the Progressive Conservative 
government going into this election 
campaign to be relatively high, and the 
likelihood of an election upset to be 
relatively low. It is important to note also 
that the province has done well relative to 
other provinces in recent years, contributing 
to the sense of stability and pride in 
Newfoundland and Labrador among 
residents. RBC’s provincial outlook pegged 
GDP growth in Newfoundland and Labrador 
at third best in the country in 2011, behind 
only Saskatchewan and Alberta, and the 
province’s move from “have not” to “have” 
status in the federation after years of 
economic hardship was quite a milestone in 
the province’s history (CBC, 2008). 
Regardless of whether or not this level of 
provincial wealth and growth will last 
forever (and research suggests that it will 
not [Locke, 2011]), going into the election 
residents generally felt positive about the 
state of the economy. 
The Legacy of Danny Williams: Positive 
feelings about the state of the economy are 
likely to be partially intertwined with 
positive attitudes towards Danny Williams, 
the former leader of the PC Party. The 
economy took off while he was Premier, 
although not necessarily because of any 
policies instituted by him or his government. 
His leadership is notable, largely because of 
his popularity, which is seen to be 
unmatched in Canadian history (Corporate 
Research Associates, 2010). With approval 
rates at about 90%, even seven years after he 
first took office, he “[left] office as Canada’s 
most popular Premier and with a record of 
personal popularity that will be difficult to 
match” (Corporate Research Associates, 
2010). Given his incredible popularity, and 
the fact that Kathy Dunderdale was 
handpicked by Williams to succeed him, 
Newfoundlanders and Labradorians, for the 
most part, had been content to evaluate 
Dunderdale positively as well.  
Polling data collected soon after the 
leadership transition indicates that voters 
continued to be satisfied with the 
performance of the PC government even 
under Dunderdale, with approval rates at 
82% in March of 2011 (Corporate Research 
Associates, 2011b). Some of this approval 
may be due to Dunderdale’s credentials and 
political career, which are not insubstantial 
(Bittner and Goodyear-Grant, 2013), but it 
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may also be partially the result of Williams’ 
continued popularity. After taking over the 
leadership of the party and throughout the 
campaign, Dunderdale made substantial 
efforts to differentiate herself from the 
previous administration, a relatively easy 
task considering Williams’ regular (and 
public) insults and comments towards her 
and her leadership (e.g., CBC, 2011c). 
While he had selected Dunderdale to 
succeed him, a few months after he was no 
longer in power, Williams’ perceptions of 
the new leader appeared to sour, and he 
made this change of heart public. As time 
passed, approval of Dunderdale’s 
government dropped from the high 
experienced under Williams, with 
satisfaction rates of 53% in September of 
2011 (Telegram 2011). This drop may be 
partially because of Williams’ media 
commentary and apparent rift with 
Dunderdale, or it may be the result of 
voters’ independent assessments of the 
government. Regardless, satisfaction rates 
remained fairly high, and undoubtedly were 
related to the Williams legacy and the 
strength of the economy. At the start of the 
campaign, it was unforeseeable that anybody 
other than Dunderdale would form 
government after October 11
th
. Indeed, polls 
conducted throughout the campaign indicate 
that voters consistently felt she was the best 
option for Premier (e.g., CBC 2011a; The 
Telegram, 2011). 
Riding the Orange Wave & the Battle for 
Opposition: The May 2011 federal election 
was a landmark in Canadian electoral 
history. Not only did the “new” 
Conservative Party form a majority, but the 
NDP moved into the seat of the official 
opposition, after the “orange wave” swept 
over the country from east to west (Smith, 
2011). Capturing a record 103 seats, 
including two in St. John’s, the NDP’s 
success was credited to Jack Layton and the 
energy that his leadership gave to the party, 
its candidates, and its volunteers. Following 
the campaign, Layton’s untimely cancer 
relapse and passing may have renewed NDP 
energy, as the desire to commemorate his 
passing was expressed by “turning the 
country orange,” whether on facebook or on 
city streets (Toronto Star, 2011).  
Given the short span of time between 
the May federal election and the October 
provincial election, much of the federal 
NDP’s campaign organization remained in 
place and ready to go (a large proportion of 
the provincial NDP’s volunteers and staff 
had also worked on the federal campaign). 
Indeed, the fixed election dates may have 
further helped the NDP, as all parties knew 
going into the federal election that they 
would be back knocking on doors in a few 
months. The fact that the NDP increased its 
presence in Ottawa and also doubled its 
Newfoundland and Labrador contingent may 
have given the party a boost in the 
provincial election, causing the Party to be 
taken more seriously as a contender by 
voters. While the party had never held more 
than two seats simultaneously in the 
province before, the likelihood that Lorraine 
Michael would no longer sit alone in the 
House of Assembly seemed high, even 
before the writ was dropped.  
As the provincial campaign 
progressed, media discussion focused on the 
polls and the race for opposition status 
between the Liberal Party and the NDP. The 
Liberal Party, historically, had been a major 
player in the province. This was the party of 
Joey Smallwood, Newfoundland’s first 
Premier following Confederation, who 
governed for the first 23 years of the 
province’s existence within Canada. The 
PCs and Liberals alternated government and 
opposition status periodically for the next 
thirty years, with the PC government taking 
over in 2003. It was in 2007 that the Liberals 
were devastated in the election, winning just 
3 seats, at which point the party was also 
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drowning in debt (CBC, 2011b). Then, when 
leader Yvonne Jones stepped down just 
weeks before the campaign in 2011, many 
noted the possible negative implications for 
the party’s success in the election (e.g., 
Canadian Press, 2011b). 
As polling numbers throughout the 
campaign showed the NDP edging out the 
Liberal Party, a first in Newfoundland and 
Labrador, the question became one of vote 
efficiency and correctly “playing the game” 
according to the electoral system (CBC, 
2011d).  Just days before the election, it was 
still unclear who would form the official 
opposition (CBC, 2011e). Indeed, in the end, 
the Liberal Party was better adapted to the 
system, winning more seats than the NDP 
even though it had a smaller share of the 
popular vote. Arguably, however, the orange 
wave that began in the federal election 
campaign earlier in the year continued to 
crash down on Newfoundland and Labrador 
during the provincial election.  Both the 
Liberals and NDP gained seats, even 
unseating prominent cabinet ministers 
within the Progressive Conservative 
government. While the question of who 
would form government was never really at 
issue, the race between the opposition 
parties became quite heated over the 
campaign. It is to explaining voters’ 
decisions that we now turn. 
Data and Measurement 
Our analysis of the outcome in the 
2011 election is based on a web-based 
survey of a representative sample of 
Newfoundland & Labrador voters. Data 
were collected from September 7
th
 to 
October 10
th
. The survey was programmed 
and fielded by the polling firm 
Harris/Decima (Ottawa). In addition to a 
measure of vote intention – our major 
dependent variable – the survey instrument 
included indicators of all the major 
determinants of the vote decision canvassed 
in the preceding section of the paper: 
demographic variables, long-term political 
dispositions, attitudes about specific 
political issues, and perceptions of party 
leaders and economic conditions. All 
analyses reported in the paper incorporate a 
sampling weight for age and gender. 
Our measure of vote intention 
combines responses to a three-part battery, 
which includes a supplemental query to 
identify “leaners” among the initially non-
responsive,
i
 and in our analyses we combine 
leaners with those expressing a vote 
intention on the initial component of the 
battery. For purposes of the analysis, we 
reduce vote intention to a four-category 
variable: Liberal, PC, and NDP voters (or 
leaners) are distinguished from all others 
(that is, those supporting other parties, not 
intending to vote, or who are “unsure” of 
their vote decision). The unsure or 
“undecided” comprise fully 84.2 percent of 
this last, residual category. By this four-part 
measure, of those expressing a vote 
intention (including leaners), the PCs 
enjoyed a very large lead over the other 
parties: 48.1 percent of those respondents 
who had decided who to vote for backed the 
PCs, 36.1 percent favoured the NDP, and 
15.7 percent supported the Liberals.
ii
 
Averaged over the campaign, 26.5 percent 
of respondents did not express a major-party 
vote intention (they supported other parties, 
were unsure or did not intend to vote). 
We examine the effects of five socio-
demographic variables: age, gender, 
religious identification, household income, 
and employment status.
iii
 The analysis also 
includes three long-term political 
dispositions: party identification, ideological 
self-identification, and a measure of moral 
traditionalism.
iv
 In addition to these 
measures of long-term forces, we also 
examine the effects of short-term forces, 
incorporating two measures of issue 
attitudes (spending on education and 
evaluations of the provincial economy) as 
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well as evaluations of party leaders.
v
 
Campaign Dynamics 
Before turning to the analysis of the 
vote decision, we first attempt to depict the 
dynamics of the campaign, in terms of vote 
intention and leader ratings.
vi
  As depicted in 
Figure 1, the campaign witnessed quite 
significant change in vote intention. 
Paralleling the commercial polls reported 
during the election, the most impressive 
dynamic involves the NDP and the Liberals. 
Support for the NDP grew from the 
beginning of the campaign. This may have 
reflected the continuing “orange wave,” 
established months earlier in the federal 
election campaign. That said, the time path 
of the NDP’s growing support allows an 
alternative reading, one that is somewhat 
independent of what happened at the 
national level.  
NDP growth was inconsistent prior 
to week 39 (September 24
th
 to 30
th
), the 
week which contained the campaign’s sole 
televised leaders’ debate, on September 29th. 
Thereafter, the party’s support grew 
steadily: by our rendering, the NDP’s share 
of vote intention grew by 50 percent over 
the final two weeks of the campaign. 
Simultaneously, Liberal support collapsed in 
this period, shrinking by two-thirds from its 
week 39 peak. It is quite possible, then, that 
the debate significantly affected the election 
outcome, at least on the opposition side. 
Side evidence from commercial pollsters 
provides circumstantial support for this 
interpretation: an MQO Research poll in the 
field for the two days following the debate 
found that just 6 percent of respondents felt 
the Liberal leader had won the debate, 
whereas 36 and 22 percent of respondents 
gave the nod to the PC and NDP leaders, 
respectively (CBC, 2011a).   
How might the debate have exerted 
its effect? Specifically, how might the 
debate have improved NDP fortunes and, 
simultaneously, dashed the hopes of the 
Liberals? One possibility is that the dynamic 
reflected improving views of Michael and 
deteriorating views of Aylward. The 
estimated leader ratings plotted in Figure 2 
suggest, however, that this can be only a part 
of the story. In contrast to the apparent spike 
in support for her party, views of Lorraine 
Michael seem to trend fairly steadily, if 
shallowly, upward across the whole length 
of the campaign. To be sure, views of 
Aylward decline following debate week, but 
they were already sliding and, further, seem 
to have recovered somewhat by the end of 
the campaign. Both of these dynamics pose 
a difficulty for the hypothesis that the 
debate’s effect on vote intention was exerted 
mainly through evaluations of these two 
leaders. An alternative interpretation is that 
the debate mainly imparted strategic 
information to voters – about the relative 
viability of the Liberals and New Democrats 
as “destinations” for those wishing to cast a 
vote against the PCs. While we cannot test 
this explanation directly, it fits with the view 
that an important feature of the election was 
the changed competitive position of the 
NDP as a result of the party’s federal 
success. However, perceptions of the party’s 
new status in the province seem not to have 
been foreordained: it took the campaign and, 
perhaps especially, the leaders’ debate to 
establish the NDP’s new place in provincial 
politics. 
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Figure 1.  Vote Intention (adjusted) by Party by Week Number 
Note: The figure plots predicted vote probabilities, by party and week, controlling for time-varying demographics 
(see discussion in text). Data are weighted. Weighted N = 694. “Other” includes other-party vote intention, those 
who are “not sure,” and intended non-voters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Leader Ratings (adjusted) by Week Number 
Note: The figure plots predicted ratings, by party and week, controlling for time-varying demographics (see 
discussion in text). Data are weighted. Weighted N = 694. Thermometer values re-scaled to the (0,1) interval. 
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Table 1.  Modeling the Vote 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Other      
      
Age -0.00715 -0.00577 -0.000266 0.00121 5.49e-06 
 (0.00519) (0.00691) (0.00785) (0.00804) (0.00891) 
Male -0.435*** -0.366** -0.413** -0.383** -0.470** 
 (0.152) (0.157) (0.181) (0.184) (0.196) 
Catholic -0.150 -0.213 -0.0830 -0.100 0.0521 
 (0.191) (0.199) (0.225) (0.228) (0.232) 
Anglican -0.0765 -0.110 -0.332 -0.347 -0.328 
 (0.219) (0.225) (0.264) (0.267) (0.285) 
No religion 0.194 0.158 -0.314 -0.315 -0.246 
 (0.216) (0.225) (0.269) (0.274) (0.286) 
> $30k/yr.  0.467* 0.0695 0.00150 0.168 
  (0.255) (0.293) (0.300) (0.325) 
$60k to $90k/yr.  -0.0759 -0.169 -0.156 -0.0855 
  (0.227) (0.258) (0.260) (0.275) 
$90k to 110k/yr.  -0.196 -0.424 -0.391 -0.319 
  (0.248) (0.283) (0.282) (0.291) 
> $110k/yr.  -0.101 -0.527* -0.460 -0.453 
  (0.239) (0.284) (0.286) (0.299) 
Unemployed  0.145 -0.0325 -0.0422 0.0805 
  (0.286) (0.302) (0.300) (0.338) 
Retired  0.0212 -0.0223 0.00761 0.131 
  (0.239) (0.276) (0.282) (0.303) 
PID: Liberal   -0.625** -0.597** -0.621** 
   (0.280) (0.281) (0.305) 
PID: PC   -1.943*** -1.876*** -1.563*** 
   (0.224) (0.227) (0.247) 
PID: NDP   0.0139 0.0748 -0.166 
   (0.326) (0.314) (0.340) 
Left self-ID   0.333 0.223 -0.122 
   (0.507) (0.523) (0.592) 
Moral trad.   -0.355 -0.387 -0.301 
   (0.315) (0.319) (0.340) 
Education spndg.    0.327 0.211 
    (0.360) (0.381) 
Prov. econ. perc.    -0.612** -0.330 
    (0.280) (0.289) 
Rtg.: Dunderdale     -2.680*** 
     (0.458) 
Rating: Aylward     0.900** 
     (0.437) 
Rating: Michael     1.058** 
     (0.450) 
Constant 0.348 0.227 1.426*** 1.520** 2.248*** 
 (0.283) (0.365) (0.504) (0.632) (0.754) 
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Table 1.  Continued 
Liberal Vote      
      
Age -0.00795 -0.000755 0.00104 -0.000327 -0.000860 
 (0.00636) (0.00838) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0127) 
Male -0.171 -0.152 -0.371 -0.405* -0.546** 
 (0.177) (0.185) (0.234) (0.237) (0.254) 
Catholic 0.0253 0.0913 0.463 0.440 0.612* 
 (0.227) (0.239) (0.319) (0.322) (0.332) 
Anglican 0.542** 0.628** 0.486 0.519 0.515 
 (0.238) (0.248) (0.335) (0.337) (0.356) 
No religion -0.0890 0.00184 0.0177 0.0678 0.121 
 (0.277) (0.296) (0.388) (0.389) (0.421) 
> $30k/yr.  -0.107 -0.763* -0.899** -0.781* 
  (0.279) (0.401) (0.420) (0.457) 
$60k to $90k/yr.  -0.639** -0.724** -0.676** -0.635* 
  (0.260) (0.316) (0.321) (0.351) 
$90k to 110k/yr.  -0.450 -0.802** -0.732** -0.666* 
  (0.278) (0.370) (0.369) (0.385) 
> $110k/yr.  -0.995*** -1.755*** -1.678*** -1.653*** 
  (0.309) (0.407) (0.416) (0.429) 
Unemployed  0.345 -0.331 -0.431 -0.296 
  (0.324) (0.434) (0.439) (0.499) 
Retired  -0.186 -0.109 -0.0115 0.127 
  (0.278) (0.377) (0.375) (0.390) 
PID: Liberal   1.965*** 2.074*** 1.859*** 
   (0.328) (0.341) (0.364) 
PID: PC   -1.539*** -1.448*** -1.198*** 
   (0.372) (0.380) (0.399) 
PID: NDP   0.968** 1.004** 0.591 
   (0.429) (0.426) (0.452) 
Left self-ID   -0.166 -0.293 -0.690 
   (0.725) (0.776) (0.890) 
Moral trad.   -0.938** -0.895** -0.915** 
   (0.404) (0.403) (0.462) 
Education spndg.    0.0938 -0.0487 
    (0.510) (0.536) 
Prov. econ. perc.    -0.884** -0.551 
    (0.359) (0.393) 
Rtg.: Dunderdale     -2.986*** 
     (0.643) 
Rating: Aylward     2.265*** 
     (0.589) 
Rating: Michael     1.112* 
     (0.627) 
Constant -0.447 -0.462 0.309 0.820 1.333 
 (0.346) (0.450) (0.772) (0.942) (1.132) 
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Table 1.  Continued 
NDP vote      
      
Age -0.0162*** -0.00653 0.00800 0.0116 0.00592 
 (0.00527) (0.00690) (0.00914) (0.00953) (0.0106) 
Male -0.0601 -0.0254 0.0261 0.0849 0.0378 
 (0.152) (0.158) (0.206) (0.216) (0.232) 
Catholic 0.130 0.101 0.475* 0.388 0.499* 
 (0.193) (0.199) (0.262) (0.265) (0.275) 
Anglican 0.258 0.211 0.0255 -0.0681 -0.118 
 (0.219) (0.227) (0.298) (0.310) (0.334) 
No religion 0.388* 0.429* -0.0101 -0.0223 -0.000634 
 (0.218) (0.226) (0.318) (0.325) (0.336) 
> $30k/yr.  -0.0893 -0.536 -0.558* -0.341 
  (0.255) (0.334) (0.336) (0.370) 
$60k to $90k/yr.  -0.462** -0.613** -0.617** -0.609* 
  (0.220) (0.284) (0.291) (0.318) 
$90k to 110k/yr.  -0.864*** -1.275*** -1.349*** -1.119*** 
  (0.251) (0.344) (0.351) (0.362) 
> $110k/yr.  -0.725*** -1.209*** -1.194*** -1.188*** 
  (0.238) (0.312) (0.319) (0.347) 
Unemployed  0.235 -0.348 -0.365 -0.143 
  (0.276) (0.351) (0.351) (0.415) 
Retired  -0.471* -0.579* -0.533* -0.327 
  (0.245) (0.295) (0.312) (0.346) 
PID: Liberal   0.133 0.0514 0.137 
   (0.297) (0.303) (0.334) 
PID: PC   -2.009*** -2.080*** -1.574*** 
   (0.281) (0.290) (0.303) 
PID: NDP   2.387*** 2.439*** 2.058*** 
   (0.318) (0.309) (0.344) 
Left self-ID   1.181* 1.075* 0.642 
   (0.609) (0.631) (0.724) 
Moral trad.   -0.408 -0.400 -0.374 
   (0.374) (0.378) (0.407) 
Education spndg.    1.528*** 1.411*** 
    (0.454) (0.503) 
Prov. econ. perc.    -0.0558 0.222 
    (0.315) (0.340) 
Rtg.: Dunderdale     -3.534*** 
     (0.505) 
Rating: Aylward     -0.0351 
     (0.497) 
Rating: Michael     2.751*** 
     (0.512) 
Constant 0.398 0.419 -0.0838 -1.421* -0.641 
 (0.277) (0.354) (0.610) (0.763) (0.954) 
      
Observations 694 666 645 641 641 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cell entries are  
multinomial probit estimates. 
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None of these dynamics, of course, 
involve the PCs. Support for the 
Conservative party and evaluations of its 
leader appear, generally, strong and stable 
across the campaign. There is a hint that the 
debate may have slightly hurt evaluations of 
Dunderdale. But, if this was so, there is little 
sign of corresponding impact on vote 
intention for the party, which reached its 
highest point in the last week of the 
campaign.
vii
 
Finally, we note the steepest trend 
across the figures: the steady and sharp 
decline in the residual category of 
undecided, non-major-party voters, and non-
voters (Fig. 1). This is no surprise, of course, 
as political interest and engagement almost 
always increases greatly during election 
campaigns. Over the course of the 
campaign, respondents became more 
engaged and interested in the campaign, and 
more certain of their vote choice. 
Explaining the Vote 
We turn now to an explanation of vote 
choice in the 2011 election. We estimate a 
multinomial probit regression model of the 
decision, since our dependent variable is 
made up of four categories.
viii
  The estimates 
in Table 1 are displayed by outcome – 
“other” (i.e., undecided, non-major-party 
voters, non-voters), Liberal vote intention 
and NDP vote intention – with PC vote 
intention as the excluded category. 
Interpreting the estimates of a multinomial 
probit model is relatively complicated – as 
compared with interpretation of, for 
example, OLS regression estimates – as the 
model includes a separate set of coefficients 
and a unique constant for each outcome 
category, save one. As a result, rather than 
discussing the coefficients themselves, we 
discuss changes in the predicted probability 
distribution of vote intention, given changes 
in the levels of the various independent 
variables.
ix
 
We estimate a succession of models, 
adding new variables at each step. 
Following Miller and Shanks (1996), we 
start with those variables most causally 
distant from the vote decision, moving 
closer to the dependent variable in 
successive models. This allows us to 
comment on the mediation of the effects of 
those variables at some remove from the 
vote decision through more proximal 
determinants. The discussion of results is 
organized in terms of three broad categories 
of explanatory factors: socio-demographics; 
long-term political dispositions; and issues 
and leader evaluations. 
Socio-demographics: The leftmost model in 
Table 1 contains the most basic of 
demographic indicators: age, sex and 
religious affiliation. The effect of age is 
comparably modest. Evaluated from the 
mean age in the sample (46.5 years), the 
estimates for Model 1 indicate that a ten 
year increase in age raises the probability of 
intending a vote for the PCs by just over 3 
points and reduces the probability of 
intending an NDP vote by an equal amount. 
Age has no notable impact on the propensity 
to vote Liberal or to express a non-major-
party vote intention. The latter result is 
somewhat surprising, given the documented 
impact of age on non-voting (e.g., Johnston, 
Matthews and Bittner, 2007). We also note 
that the effect of age would seem mainly to 
reflect socio-economic considerations, as the 
effect of age disappears in Model 2, which 
adds income and employment status to the 
equations.  
By comparison with age, the effect 
of sex on vote intention is large and robust. 
Results for the fully saturated model – 
Model 5 – reveal that the influence of 
gender is not explained away by other 
variables in the analysis, that is, by income, 
partisanship, issue attitudes, etc. Even 
controlling for all these other influences, 
men are 8.5 points less likely than women to 
express a non-major-party preference, and 
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 9, No. 2, 2015 pp. 21-41 
 
33 
 
5.5 and 5.0 points more likely to support the 
PCs and NDP, respectively.
x
  
Religious affiliation also exerts 
significant effects. In the fully saturated 
model, with a host of values, issue attitudes 
and leader evaluations controlled, Catholics 
are 4.5 points less likely to express a non-
major-party vote intention, 4 points more 
likely to support the Liberals, 4 points less 
likely to support the PCs and 4.5 points 
more likely to support the NDP. The data 
suggest that if it weren’t for their issue 
attitudes and leader evaluations, Catholics as 
a group would be more inclined to support 
the Liberals and NDP. 
Model 2 adds two further socio-
demographics to the model: income and 
employment status. Income clearly exerts 
important effects, particularly on the 
propensity to support the PCs and NDP. In 
the fully saturated model (Model 5), for 
instance, compared with the reference 
group, those earning more than $110,000 are 
12 points more likely to support the PCs and 
8 points less likely to support the NDP. As 
regards the other income categories, effects 
are generally more modest. Those in the 
$60,000 to $90,000/year category are, in 
Model 2, more likely to support the PCs (by 
9 points) and less likely to support the NDP 
(by 8 points) than those in the modal 
category of income. However, these 
differences shrink by roughly one-half once 
other determinants are controlled in Model 
5. Support for the Liberal Party is, on the 
whole, not greatly differentiated by income. 
The largest difference involves those in the 
highest income category, who are, according 
to Model 2, approximately 9 points less 
likely to support the Liberals than those in 
the reference group, a difference that is only 
modestly affected by the addition of controls 
(Model 5).
xi
 
Long-term political dispositions: In Model 3 
we add to the equations party identification 
and the indicators of ideological self-
identification and moral traditionalism. As 
compared with the influence of 
demographics, the impact of party 
identification on vote intention is simply 
massive. Relative to non-major-party 
identifiers, Liberal, PC and NDP partisans 
are, respectively, 34, 45, and almost 52 
points more likely to support “their” party. 
Simultaneously, partisans are far less likely 
to support any other party than are non-
major-party identifiers – except for Liberal 
partisans. PC partisans are, relative to the 
reference group, 25 and 16 points less likely 
to support the Liberals and NDP, 
respectively. NDP partisans, similarly, are 
25 and 23 points less likely to support the 
Liberals and PCs, respectively, as compared 
with non-major-party identifiers. By 
contrast, Liberal partisans are just 8 points 
less likely to support the PCs and a mere 5 
points less likely to support the NDP than 
non-major-party identifiers. The overall 
pattern suggests that partisan ties for 
Liberals were relatively weaker than for the 
other parties, a finding that may reflect the 
challenging competitive circumstances faced 
by the party in 2011. 
The addition of issue attitudes and 
leader evaluations to the equations, in Model 
5, partially explains the influence of party 
identification. This is as it should be: the 
influence of partisanship on issue opinions 
and view of party leaders is well established 
(Campbell et al., 1960). Even so, a powerful 
direct effect of party identification survives 
the inclusion of controls. Relative to non-
major-party identifiers, the estimates for 
Model 5 indicate that Liberal, PC and NDP 
partisans are, respectively, 29, 30, and 41 
points more likely to support “their” party. 
The final noteworthy finding regarding party 
identification concerns its influence on the 
likelihood of expressing a non-major-party 
vote intention: in Model 3 all partisans are, 
approximately, 20 points less likely to find 
themselves in this category than non-major-
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party identifiers, a pattern that is basically 
unchanged by the addition of controls for 
issues attitudes and leader evaluations. 
Again, this fits a well-established pattern, 
inasmuch as partisanship influences not only 
the direction but also the intensity of 
political engagement, both behaviourally 
and cognitively. 
Relative to the influence of party 
identification, the effects of the other long-
term dispositions seem modest. The largest 
effect concerns ideology. According to the 
estimates for Model 3, left self-identifiers 
are, compared with right self-identifiers, 17 
points more likely to support the NDP and 9 
and 7 points less likely to support the PCs 
and Liberals, respectively. Moral 
traditionalism’s effect is more modest: those 
taking the most traditional view are roughly 
8 points more likely to support the PCs and 
7 points less likely to support the Liberals 
than those expressing the least traditional 
orientation on this dimension. 
Appropriately, the influence of both these 
variables is compressed once issue attitudes 
and leader evaluations are added to the 
analysis (Model 5), reflecting the influence 
of values and ideology on more specific 
political attitudes (Feldman, 1988).
xii
 
Issues and Leader Evaluations: The final 
categories of vote determinants we consider 
are issue attitudes and views of the party 
leaders. Just two issues exert significant 
effects in our models: education spending 
attitudes and retrospective perceptions of 
provincial economic conditions. The former 
of these variables exerts the larger and more 
robust effect. As seen in the fully saturated 
model, those wishing “more” education 
spending, as compared with those favouring 
less spending, are almost 15 points more 
likely to support the NDP and nearly 6 
points less likely to support the PCs. 
Support for the Liberals and the likelihood 
of expressing a non-major party vote 
intention are little influenced by education 
spending attitudes.  
As regards economic perceptions, 
notable, if modest, effects are observed for 
all categories of the dependent variable. 
Relative to those who thought 
Newfoundland and Labrador’s economy had 
deteriorated over the preceding year, those 
who thought the economy had “gotten 
better” are 9.5 points more likely to support 
the PCs, 6 points more likely to support the 
NDP, 6 points less likely to support the 
Liberals, and 9.5 points less likely to express 
a non-major-party vote intention. The 
estimates for Model 5 indicate that most of 
these effects are mediated by leader 
evaluations, particularly the positive 
influence of economic perceptions on PC 
support: with views of leaders controlled, 
the positive impact of economic perceptions 
on PC support shrinks to less than 4 points. 
The favourable effect of economic sentiment 
on incumbent support is, of course, a 
predictable pattern. The modest magnitude 
of the effect also fits results in other 
contexts, as the influence of economic 
considerations is generally greatest when 
economic perceptions are most sour – unlike 
the perceptions of the average 
Newfoundlander and Labradorian in 2011.
xiii
  
Finally, the influence of leader 
evaluations – the most causally proximal 
determinant of vote intention – is very great 
indeed. This fits with recent research 
(Bittner, 2011) demonstrating that leaders 
play an important and enduring role in the 
minds of voters. As demonstrated in Model 
5, evaluations of Kathy Dunderdale have by 
far the largest influence. Those with the 
most favourable view of the incumbent 
Premier are fully 49 points more likely to 
back the PCs than those taking the least 
favourable view of her. On the likelihood of 
supporting the NDP and the Liberals, the 
influence of evaluations of Dunderdale is 
complimentary: those with the highest rating 
of Dunderdale were, as compared to those 
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giving the lowest rating, 23 points less likely 
to favour the NDP and 7 points less likely to 
favour the Liberals. Poor evaluations of 
Dunderdale may also have demobilized 
voters in the election, as those with the 
poorest ratings are 19 points more likely to 
express a non-major-party vote intention 
than those with the best ratings. 
The effects of evaluations of the 
other leaders are more modest. For Michael, 
the difference between those with the most 
and those with the least favourable 
evaluations is 30 points in the probability of 
NDP support. The counterpart figure for the 
impact of evaluations of Aylward on Liberal 
support is just 21 points. Those with the 
most favourable view of Michael are 24 
points less likely to support the PCs than 
those with the least favourable view, while 
differences between these two groups in 
their likelihood of Liberal support or of 
expressing a non-major-party vote intention 
are insignificant. Those with the best – 
compared to those with the worst – 
evaluations of Aylward are 15 and 14 points 
less likely to support the PCs and NDP, 
respectively. Interestingly, positive 
evaluations of Aylward also increase the 
likelihood of expressing a non-major-party 
vote intention, relative to those expressing 
negative Aylward evaluations. In keeping 
with other findings, this result may reflect 
the diminished strategic position of the 
Liberals in 2011. That is, given the Liberals’ 
flagging fortunes, some Aylward supporters 
may have had difficulty committing to a 
Liberal vote, in spite of their favourable 
impressions of the Liberal leader. 
Conclusions 
Our account of the 2011 election in 
Newfoundland and Labrador reveals a 
mixture of long-term and short-term forces 
at work.  
Demographic variables are clearly a 
part of the story in this election, with such 
basic individual characteristics as age, 
religion and employment status exerting 
notable effects. The most important of the 
demographic influences arises from income. 
The variable is sharply implicated in support 
for the PCs and NDP, a dynamic that 
approximates the traditional pattern of class 
voting: the wealthiest voters tended to 
favour the fiscally conservative PCs, while 
those earning a middling income were more 
likely to back the social democratic NDP. A 
wrinkle in this “class politics” interpretation 
is that the income effects are not reducible to 
differences in political values or issue 
attitudes; the effects persist in the presence 
of controls for these factors. This suggests 
that the parties may have forged links with 
social categories that are more symbolic in 
nature: middle income voters, for instance, 
may be more likely than higher income 
voters to find themselves reflected in the 
social imagery of the NDP. 
Demographics aside, the effect of 
partisanship in the 2011 election result was 
huge. Only part of this effect passes through 
more proximal influences on the vote. With 
issue attitudes and leader evaluations 
controlled, significant partisan effects 
remain. This pattern, together with the 
robust influence of demographic variables, 
fits the expectation that an election 
landscape largely bereft of issue conflict 
should lead voters to fall back on basic 
social identities. And, indeed, there is little 
evidence of specific issues driving voters’ 
decisions. We tested the influence of nine 
possible issue dimensions and just two 
mattered: education spending and the 
economy. The effect of economic 
perceptions was highly predictable. The 
influence of education spending attitudes 
may reflect the prominence of relevant 
commitments in the NDP platform (Bailey, 
2011b), especially as these commitments 
were raised during the leaders’ debate. 
We began this paper by noting that 
the election was really about who would 
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form Official Opposition, and we pointed to 
the incredible inroads made by the NDP in 
the 2011 election. We must end by talking 
about the fortunes of the Liberal Party. The 
relationship between the Liberal Party and 
its voters as seen in this election was 
perhaps the most interesting story to come 
out of the election results. Put simply, those 
inclined toward the Liberals by either 
partisanship or leader evaluations were, in 
relative terms, more weakly attached than 
those inclined toward the PCs and the NDP. 
The effect of Liberal party identification on 
vote intention was significantly weaker than 
that associated with PC or NDP 
partisanship. Likewise, positive evaluations 
of Aylward had a weaker effect on the vote 
than positive evaluations for either 
Dunderdale or Michael. Worse still for the 
Liberals, those with the most positive view 
of Aylward were also more likely (than 
those with the most negative view of 
Aylward) to express a non-major-party vote 
intention, that is, to be undecided, to support 
a non-major party or to stay home. Liking 
Aylward, it seems, had a slight demobilizing 
effect on voters. The total pattern, along 
with the plunge in Liberal fortunes 
following the debate, would seem to speak 
to the strategic predicament of the Liberal 
Party in 2011. Put simply, many voters who 
might, under “normal” circumstances, have 
liked to back the Liberals seem to have 
reconsidered by Election Day.  
While we lack direct evidence of 
these voters’ reasoning processes, we 
suspect that strategic considerations were 
prominent for voters in Newfoundland and 
Labrador in 2011. The party was simply not 
seen to be viable in the way that it had been 
in the past, and traditional Liberal voters 
were not inspired to stand behind the party. 
The Conservative Party was expected by all 
to form government, and we suspect that 
over the course of the campaign, the NDP 
became more and more viable. While the 
Liberal Party managed to squeeze out 
enough seats to form Official Opposition, 
the leader lost his seat, and the Party’s 
fortunes did not even remotely resemble the 
type of legislative presence they had had in 
the previous half century. While the PCs 
only lost a few seats in the 2011 election, the 
competitive dynamic between the parties 
was much changed in the province. Whether 
this change is lasting remains to be seen. An 
election is set to take place in November of 
2015, and most indicators suggest the PC 
party does not sit in the same position of 
comfort as it did in 2011. 
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i
 Complete question wordings for all variables available from the authors. 
ii
 The more than 31 points that separated the PCs and NDP on Election Day are compressed to 
just 12 points in our data. Notably, the departure from Election Day vote shares is, in relative 
terms, visited disproportionately on the NDP, whose survey-estimated vote share is nearly one-
half larger than that recorded by Elections Newfoundland. While this bias in our data confounds 
estimates of “levels” (of, for example, vote intention; see below), it should have no significant 
impact on our ability to probe the determinants of vote choice (where our concern is differences 
between groups).  
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iii
 Age is a scale measured in years. The variable ranges from 19 to 87, and the average 
respondent is aged 46.5 years. We capture respondent sex with an indicator for males; by design, 
precisely one-half of the sample is male. The survey captures twenty-two categories of religious 
identification. In the analysis, we reduce these to four: using three dummy variables we compare 
Catholics, Anglicans and those indicating no religious affiliations with all others. The 
distribution across these categories is 29.5, 19.3, 18.8 and 32.5 percent, respectively. Household 
income is divided into five levels: less than $30,000/year; $30,000 to less than $60,000/year; 
$60,000 to less than $90,000/year; $90,000 to less than $110,000/year; and more than 
$110,000/year. We capture the variable with four dummies, excluding the modal category 
($30,000 to less than $60,000/year). Finally, we capture employment status with two dummy 
variables, distinguishing the unemployed and the retired from all others, a category which 
includes mostly those working full- or part-time. 10.4 and 22.2 percent of the sample falls in the 
unemployed and retired categories, respectively. 
iv
 Party identification is measured with the standard, Michigan-derived instrumentation, and we 
use three dummy variables to separate Liberal, PC and NDP identifiers from all others (non-
major-party identifiers and non-partisans). The variable indicates, as we would expect, that the 
PCs enjoy a huge advantage in long-run party affiliation: fully 38.0 percent of the sample 
identifies with the party. The Liberals and NDP capture 17.3 and 21.8 percent of the sample, 
respectively. We include an indicator of ideological self-identification that asks respondents to 
place themselves on a zero to ten scale running from “left” to “right.” The variable is scaled to 
vary from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates the “leftmost” ideological commitments. The mean 
respondent to the survey places herself just to the right of center, or at 0.48 on our rescaled 
indicator, and the modal respondent is dead center (0.5). Finally, we include an indicator of 
moral traditionalism, using a widely used measure that asks respondents to express agreement 
with this statement: “This country would have fewer problems if there was more emphasis on 
traditional family values.” We scale the variable to the (0,1) interval, where 1 corresponds to the 
most conservative or “traditional” viewpoint. The indicator is somewhat orthogonal to 
ideological self-identification (r(ideology, moral traditionalism) = -0.25) and the average 
respondent places herself at 0.61 on the rescaled variable. 
v
 We scale the education spending measure to the (0,1) interval. By this indicator, support for 
increased education expenditures is nearly consensual in Newfoundland and Labrador: the mean 
respondent is found at 0.83 on the variable. Our measure of provincial economic evaluations is 
based on the standard, retrospective item used in national-level studies throughout the world. 
Respondents were asked: “Over the PAST YEAR has Newfoundland and Labrador’s economy: 
gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed about the same?” Scaling the variable to the (0,1) interval, 
where 1 corresponds to “gotten better,” we find, unsurprisingly, that respondents are positive 
indeed about economic conditions in the province: the variable’s mean is 0.67. We measure 
evaluations of the party leaders using three questions that ask respondents to rate each of the 
major-party leaders on a zero to one-hundred scale, running from “really dislike” to “really like.” 
We compress responses to the (0,1) interval for the analysis. By this measure, respondents felt 
most warmly – although not too warmly – about Dunderdale, followed fairly closely by Michael, 
with Aylward a relatively distant third: the mean ratings were, respectively, 0.55, 0.47, and 0.31. 
vi
 We apply statistical adjustments to our data, as the demographic composition of our sample 
varied in consequential ways across the campaign. Put simply, given that some demographic 
groups (e.g., the aged, women) were more likely to respond quickly to the survey than other 
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groups (e.g., youth, the employed), a failure to apply statistical corrections would conflate 
changes in sample composition with real aggregate movement in vote intention. Accordingly, the 
over-time estimates for each week of the campaign, plotted in Figures 1 and 2, are predicted 
values based on regression models including controls for age, gender, education, employment 
status, and income. Specifically, the predicted vote probabilities (Fig. 1) derive from estimates of 
a multinomial probit regression model including, in addition to the controls noted in the main 
text, indicators for each week of the campaign, save for the first week (the reference category). 
The predicted leader ratings (Fig. 2) derive from estimates of an OLS regression model including 
the same structure of controls and week indicators. Note also that week numbers refer to weeks 
of the year and that, as the preceding suggests, the number of respondents interviewed in a given 
week varies. Finally, as observed in the preceding section, our sample overstates the magnitude 
of NDP support somewhat. Therefore, we focus the discussion on change in, rather than levels 
of, vote intention. 
vii
 Note: the spikes seen in both figures between weeks 36 and 37 should not be taken too 
seriously: the first reading in each series is implausibly low for the PCs/Dunderdale.  This very 
likely reflects the fact that just 18 interviews were completed in the three days of fieldwork that 
took place in week 36; that is to say, our estimates for week 36 are highly imprecise. 
viii
 Multinomial probit regression has desirable properties for our purposes, including the fact that 
it is robust to violations of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption (unlike, 
for example, multinomial logit [Dow and Endersby, 2004]). 
ix
 Specifically, we predict the probability distribution of vote intention, assuming all respondents 
take on the same, analytically interesting level of a given variable (e.g., the variable’s minimum), 
while levels of other variables are held at their observed values. We then repeat the procedure, 
this time assuming all respondents take on another analytically interesting level of the variable 
(e.g., it’s maximum). Finally, we report the difference in the means of the two distributions as 
the variable’s marginal effect. This is sometimes called “the method of recycled predictions.” 
x
 The significant effect of sex on non-major-party vote intention suggests a participation effect. 
On our measure, non-major-party vote intention is a species of non-participation, at least at a 
cognitive level, as most of the respondents in this category are undecided and some even intend 
not to vote. While gender gaps in political participation and interest have narrowed over time, 
these results fit the historical pattern. 
xi
 We also evaluated the effects of other demographic variables. However, none of these 
achieved conventional levels of statistical significance when entered into the basic demographic 
set-up. These variables were: education, union membership, home ownership, marital status, and 
parental status. 
xii
 We also examined the effects of other long-term dispositions: egalitarianism, economic 
individualism and anti-racism. None of these achieved statistical significance when added to 
Model 3. 
 
xiii
 We also examined the influence of a number of other issue attitudes, including views on 
corporate and personal income taxes and spending attitudes in several policy areas (health care, 
welfare, environment, crime and immigration). None of these achieved statistical significance at 
conventional levels when entered into the vote model. 
